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POINT ONE 
UTAH STANDS ALONE 
AMONG ALL 50 STATES ON 
THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
FOR DRUNK DRIVING 
In a companion case, this Court implies that Utah 
follows a majority rule on punitive damages: 
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 
which have considered the issue have ruled 
that punitive damages are available in 
drunk driving cases. 
• * * * 
We agree with the majority of other 
jurisdictions and with the Utah Court of 
Appeals. We see no reason to exclude drunk 
driving from the categories of outrageous 
conduct, either willful or knowingly 
reckless, which are eligible for the 
imposition of punitive damages. 
Johnson v. Rogers, No. 20622, Slip Opinion (August 25, 1988). 
However, Utah did not join the majority. Neither has 
Utah joined the minority. Utah has created an anomalous rule 
with stands alone. In Utah, it is not "reckless" conduct to be 
a little bit drunk.1 However, in Utah, it may be "reckless 
conduct to be super drunk.^ 
xThe blood alcohol level in this case was .08. 
2In the companion case of Johnson v. Rogers, punitive 
damages were allowed for a blood alcohol level of .18. 
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Justice Zimmerman's opinion cites no authority on the 
issue of being slightly drunk vs. super drunk. During the 
briefing, Carter cited one or perhaps two cases which suggested 
a difference between being slightly drunk or super drunk. (See 
Brief of Resp. at p. 13 and 14.) However, those cases were 
misleading because they involved questions of "malice-in-fact." 
On the other hand, where the test is malice-in-law (or 
"reckless" conduct), drunk driving always goes to the jury. 
There are no cases to the contrary. 
Whether or not a driver is drunk, is always tested by 
the statutory minimum blood alcohol level. (In Utah, .08.) 
See e.g., Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So.2d 922 (Fla. 1976); Adams v. 
Hunter, 343 F.Supp. 1984 (D. S.C. 1972) (Applying South 
Carolina law); Fritz v. Salva, 406 So.2d 884 (Ala. 1981); 
Harrell v. Ames, 508 P.2d 211 (Or. 1973); Hawkinson v. Geyer, 
352 N.W.2d 784 (Minn. App. 1984). 
Even in those cases which do not specifically 
discuss blood alcohol results, it is implicit that the Courts 
have looked to the statutes to determine the blood alcohol 
level which would constitute "reckless" conduct. See e.g., 
Holmes v. Hollinqsworth, 352 S.W.2d 96 (Ark. 1961); Colliqan v. 
Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306 (N.Y. 1973); Infeld v. Sullivan, 199 
A.2d 693 (Conn. 1964); Campbell v. VanRoekel, 347 N.W.2d 406 
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(Iowa 1984); Miller v. Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293 (Ark. 1948); 
Sebastian v. Wood, 66 N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1954); Svejcara v. 
Whitman, 487 P.2d 167 (N.M. 1971). 
POINT TWO 
THE STATUTORY TEST (.08 BLOOD 
ALCOHOL LEVEL) IS THE ONLY TEST FOR 
DRUNK DRIVING WITH AN EMPIRICAL BASIS 
The Utah Legislature has established a blood alcohol 
level of .08 as a prima facie level for drunk driving. (See 
§41-6-44(1), Utah Code Ann.) That level of .08 was based upon 
lengthy committee hearings and floor debates which included 
presentation of medical evidence and statistics. Thus, this 
Court has an empirical basis for adopting a blood alcohol level 
of .08 as a threshold for drunk driving. In essence, the Court 
simply borrows or adopts the factual findings of the legisla-
ture . 
This Court's opinion in Miskin v. Carter holds that 
it is not reckless conduct for a person to drive with a blood 
alcohol level of .08. However, there is no medical evidence 
in this record to support that conclusion. On the other hand, 
Johnson v. Rogers, supra, allows punitive damages for a blood 
alcohol level of .18. Upon what factual basis did the court 
3 
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differentiate between a .18 blood alcohol level as opposed to a 
.08 blood alcohol level? Or stated in other words, on a 
factual level, this court has merely speculated as to the 
difference between a .08 blood alcohol level and a .18 blood 
alcohol level. 
This Court has underestimated the effect of a .08 
blood alcohol level. See The Presidential Commission on Drunk 
Driving, Brief of Appellant, Exhibit A at p. 17. 
Moreover, the Presidential Commission was critical of 
judges who view these standards too lightly. 
[M]ost of these judges have had 
little or no formal training in either the 
adjudication of these cases or in alcohol 
use and traffic safety. All too often, the 
judiciary fails to view driving under the 
influence as a serious offense meriting 
certain, swift, and appropriate punish-
ment . 
Finally, this Court should note that a very substan-
tial number of deaths have occurred in Utah where drivers had 
a blood alcohol level of .08 or less. (See Brief of Appellant, 
Exhibit C at p. 27.) Thus, the only empirical data in this 
record suggests that driving with a blood alcohol level of .08% 
is both dangerous and "reckless." 
4 
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POINT THREE 
THIS COURTrS OPINION OVERLOOKS THE STRICT 
PUBLIC POLICY AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING IN UTAH 
This court has held that it is not reckless to drive 
with a blood alcohol level of .08. (Miskin v. Carter.) On 
the other hand, it may be reckless to drive with a blood 
alcohol level of .18. (Johnson v. Rogers, supra.) 
However, the Utah legislature has ruled exactly the 
opposite. The Utah legislature has mandated a string of 
serious criminal penalties beginning at .08 blood alcohol 
level. (See §41-6-44 et seq. and §63-43-9 Utah Code Ann.) 
However, the Utah Legislature does not set extra criminal 
sanctions when a person is super drunk. 
Indeed, the criminal penalty for "reckless driving" 
is only a Class B misdemeanor (see §41-6-45 Utah Code Ann. ) , 
yet the criminal penalty for driving with a .08 blood alcohol 
level, with injuries, is a Class A misdemeanor (see §41-6-
44(3)(a) Utah Code Ann.). 
Thus, we have an anomalous situation. The civil 
courts of this state hold it is not "reckless" to have a blood 
alcohol level of .08. At the same time, the Legislature gives 
a harsher penalty for driving with a .08 blood alcohol level 
5 
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(viz. a Class A misdemeanor), and a lesser penalty for 
"reckless driving" (Class B misdemeanor). 
POINT FOUR 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES ARE 
NOT REQUIRED IN OTHER STATES BEFORE 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED 
In this case, the Court noted that there was no 
history of alcoholism or of prior D.U.I, arrests. The Court 
further noted that there was no erratic or reckless pattern of 
driving (Miskin v. Carter, Slip Opinion at p. 4.) The 
implication is that more than mere drunk driving is necessary 
to support punitive damages. Compare Johnson v. Rogers, 
supra. at pgs. 7 and 21. Neither this Court's opinion nor 
Carter's brief cite any cases to support the position that 
more is required. Indeed, Johnson v. Rogers, supra., relies 
upon the case of Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 598 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1979); however, the specific 
holding of Taylor states to the contrary: 
Plaintiff seeks to distinguish Gombos by 
stressing the additional allegations in the 
present complaint which include defendant's 
history of alcoholism, his prior arrests 
and convictions for drunk driving, his 
prior accident attributable to his 
intoxication, and his acceptance of 
employment involving the transportation of 
alcoholic beverages. Certainly, the 
6 
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foregoing allegations may reasonably be 
said to confirm defendant's awareness of 
his inability to operate a motor vehicle 
safely while intoxicated. Yet the essence 
of the Gombos and present complaints 
remains the same: Defendant became intoxi-
cated and thereafter drove a car while in 
that condition, despite his knowledge of 
the safety hazard he created thereby. This 
is the essential gravamen of the complaint, 
and while a history of prior arrests, 
convictions and mishaps may heighten the 
probability and foreseeability of an 
accident, we do not deem these aggravating 
factors essential prerequisites to the 
assessment of punitive damages in drunk 
driving cases. 
• * * * 
There is a very commonly understood risk 
which attends every motor vehicle driver 
who is intoxicated. [Citation omitted.] 
One who wilfully consumes alcoholic 
beverages to the point of intoxication, 
knowing that he thereafter must operate a 
motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply 
impaired physical and mental faculties with 
a vehicle capable of great force and speed, 
reasonably may be held to exhibit a 
conscious disregard of the safety of 
others. The effect may be lethal whether 
or not the driver had a prior history of 
drunk driving incidents. 
Taylor v. Superior Court, Id. , at 857. See also Anderson v. 
Amundson, 354 N.W.2d 895, 898 (Minn. 1984): 
A majority of the states that have 
addressed this issue support the view that 
driving while intoxicated is in itself 
sufficiently reckless or wanton to warrant 
punitive damages, 
Ingram v. Petit, supra., at 924: 
7 
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We affirmatively hold that the voluntary 
act of driving "while intoxicated" evinces, 
without more, a sufficiently reckless 
attitude for a jury to be asked to provide 
an award of punitive damages if it 
determines liability exists for compen-
satory damages. 
POINT FIVE 
THIS COURT'S OPINION 
DOES NOT CONSTRUE THE FACTS 
IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO MISKIN 
This Court's opinion stressed that Carter had only 
three to four drinks; and, that she thereafter waited four 
hours to drive her car. That statement is self-serving. 
Miskin had no particular reason to challenge that testimony 
because the blood alcohol level of .08 showed that Carter was 
drunk as a matter of law. 
If the case proceeded to trial, Miskin would have 
requested the Court to take judicial notice of the drink-
ing/driving chart.^ According to that chart, Carter had no 
business driving a car for approximately 9-1/2 to 12-1/2 
hours. A jury might think that Carter was "reckless" for 
-*See Exhibit A. This chart is published by the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. This Court can take judicial 
notice of the same facts pursuant to Rule 201(f) Ut. Rules of 
Evidence. 
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waiting only four hours to drive when she should have waited 
9 1/2 to 12 1/2 hours to drive. 
Likewise, this Court stressed that there was no 
erratic driving pattern. The Court stated that Carter "simply 
entered the intersection after the light changed." That is 
certainly one way to view the evidence. However, a jury might 
regard the evidence differently. This time it was a whiplash. 
Next time, children may be in the street! A jury might regard 
running a red light while impaired from alcohol to be "reck-
less 
CONCLUSION 
Those jurisdictions adopting the "reckless disregard" 
standard have uniformly found that intoxication itself combined 
with an act of negligence, without more, is sufficient to 
satisfy the stated standard and justify an award of punitive 
damages. Additionally, in defining "intoxication," the courts 
have almost without exception looked to existing penal statutes 
as establishing conclusively the appropriate point at which one 
becomes intoxicated as a matter of law. It is submitted that 
if the existing evidence is viewed in the light most favorable 
to Miskin, the Court will find, as have courts in an overwhelm-
ing number of jurisdictions applying the "reckless disregard" 
9 
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standard, that punitive damages may be awarded. In so doing, 
the Court will be legitimizing one of the most important public 
policy concerns of our day. 
DATED this / - ^ day of S^fi^^^^ , 1988. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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The chart below shows approximately how 
long a person should wait before driving. 
DRINKING / DRIVING CHART 
Number of Drinks* Consumed 
BODY 
W E I G H T 
1 0 0 lb. 
1 2 0 lb. 
1 4 0 lb. 
1 60 lb. 
1 8 0 lb. 
200 lb. 
2201b. 
4u~ 
1 1 2 3 4 ['"" 5 r 6~ ~  
H ours to wa i t a f ter start of 
drinking and before driving 
1 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 ° 1 o 
3 
2 
1V, 
V, 
0 
0 
0 
6 
4V, 
3 V, 
2% 
2 
17, 
1 
97, 
77, 
57, 
4 V. 
3% 
3 
2% 
! 12% 
9% 
8 
67, 
57, j 
4% 
3% j 
15V, 1 
12 
10 
8 V, 
7 
6 
57, J 
5? 
(D<0 
X3 IT 
o^a* 
e3^< 
O X 
en 
i 
'ojf \ 
o i ' . 
c/>3 
0) J 
ST 
*<" 
* 1 Drink = 86 proof Vk oz. of whiskey, gin, vodka, etc. 
1 bottle beer (12 oz.) 3 oz. wine (20%) or 5 oz. wine (12%). 
This card is printed for your information only. No person should rely on this 
information for the purpose of making a decision to drive an automobile. 
The best advice is when you drink don't drive. 
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